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O'Connor: The Automobile Exception

VEHICLE SEARCHES- THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIDE

FROM CARROLL V. UNITED STATES TO
WYOMING V. HOUGHTON
Martin L. O'Connor*
I. INTRODUCTION

With respect to automobile searches, there has been substantial
criticism of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court.' Some commentators suggest that the
Court's automobile cases have resulted in a shrinking or eroding of
Fourth Amendment protections.2 Others have been more critical,
suggesting that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment agenda is
*Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, C.W. Post of Long
Island University. Acting Village Justice Mill Neck, N.Y. Former Deputy Police
Commissioner in charge of legal affairs for the Nassau County, New York
Police Department and the Suffolk County, New York Police Department.
I See generally, James A. Adams, The Supreme Court's Improbable
Justiflcation for Restriction of Citizens' Fourth Amendment Privacy
Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833 (1999); Robert Angell,
California v. Acevedo And The Shrinking Fourth Amendment. 21 CAP. U. L.

REv. 707 (1992); Norma J. Briscoe, The Right To Be Free From Unreasonable
Searches and Warrantless Searches Of Closed Containers in Automobiles, 36
HOWARD L.J. 215 (1993); Todd P. Guthrie, California v. Acevedo: Now You
See It, Now You Don't-The Supreme Court's Latest Approach To The Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement, 45 ARK. L. REV. 397 (1992); Jeffrey 0.
Himstreet, The Executive's War On Crime Takes A Bite Out Of Privacy In
California v. Acevedo, 28 VILLIAMETTr L. REV. 195 (1991); Peter C.
Prynkiewicz, Californiav. Acevedo: The Court EstablishesOne Rule To Govern
All Automobile Searches And Opens The Door To Another "FrontalAssault"
On the WarrantRequirement, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1269 (1992); Matthew J.
Saly, Wren v. United States: Buckle Up And Hold Tight Because The
Constitution Won't Protect You, 28 PAC. L.J. 595 (1997); Chris K. Visser,
Without A Warrant, Probable Cause, Or Reasonable Suspicion; Is There Any
Meaning To The FourthAmendment While Driving A Car?, 35 HOUS. L. REv.
1683 (1999).
2 Lisa K. Coleman, California v. Acevedo: The Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Right To Be Free From UnreasonableSearches, 22 MEMPHIS ST.
UNIV. L. REV. 831 (1992).
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to justify virtually any and all law enforcement practices,
regardless of the cost to individual liberties.3 Many of the
criticisms of the Court deal with the application of the "automobile
exception" that was created seventy-five years ago in Carroll v.
4
UnitedStates.
This article is designed to examine the history of the automobile
exception. It traces the relatively stable constitutional ride of the
automobile exception through its first fifty years and then the
subverting of the Carroll exigency requirement in Chambers v.
Maroney, ' and the container exception detour that was created by
Chadwick and Sanders.' It follows with an analysis of cases that
permitted the Court to emerge from the container exception
morass. Finally, the article reviews the demise of the Carroll
exigency requirement and the rejection of a personal property
exception in Wyoming v. Houghton!
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.8
The United States Supreme Court has said that the basic purpose
of the Amendment is to. prevent government officials from
I Craig Hemmens, The Supreme Court: Lapdog Of Law Enforcement Or
Principled Expounder of Constitutional Protections? 12 JUST. PROF. 356
(1999).
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
6 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977)(holding that closed containers in motor vehicles
cannot be searched without a warrant and in effect creating a container
exception within an automobile exception).
7 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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arbitrarily invading the privacy of an individual. 9 Although the
Fourth Amendment mentions warrants, "neither federal nor state
courts have established a satisfactory conceptual framework for
analyzing the basic issue of when a warrant is required to validate
a search."' 0 According to the Supreme Court, there is a cardinal
principle that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and
subject only to a few exceptions." However, in Carrollv. United
States, the Supreme Court authorized the police to search mobile
vehicles without a warrant and, in so doing, created an
extraordinary exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
2
requirement.1
U.

THE BIRTH OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Carrollv. UnitedStates (1925)

This case arose during the height of prohibition. George Carroll
and a friend were driving on a highway while transporting
numerous quarts of whiskey and gin in their automobile in

9 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949).
1 Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking The FourthAmendment Warrant Requirement,
64 AM.CRm. L. REv. 603, 604 (1982).
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978).
2 There are several other exceptions to the warrant requirement such as a
search incident to an arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
stop and frisk search, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); consent search,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973; exigent circumstances, Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). This listing is not all-inclusive and there is a
difference of opinion regarding whether there are a few or many exceptions to
the warrant requirement. See Katz v. U.S. 389 U.S. 347,357 (1964) concluding
that there are only a "few . .. well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant
requirement But see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) Scalia noted that the warrant requirement is "riddled with
exceptions." Id In addition Justice Scalia noted that one commentator
catalogued at least twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id at 582-83
citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV., 1468, 1473-74(1985). See also Florida v. Hite, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 1561
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) arguing that the warrant exceptions "have all but
swallowed the rule." Id
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violation of the National Prohibition Act (the "Act").'3 The Act
provided that if a law enforcement officer discovers any person
unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors in any automobile or
other vehicle, "it shall be his duty to seize the liquor."' 4 Law
enforcement agentshad probable cause to believe that Carroll's
vehicle was transporting alcohol in violation of the Act, so they
stopped the car. 5 The officers then conducted a warrantless search
of the car and tore open the seat cushions, where they found sixtyeight quarts of liquor. 6 Carroll and his associate were arrested and
convicted for violation of the Act. 7
Carroll appealed his
conviction to the United States Supreme Court contending that he
had been the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure because
the officers made a warrantless search of his car.' 8
At the outset of the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Taft, writing
for the majority, stated that the Fourth Amendment should be
construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 9 Chief Justice
Taft then carefully examined the legislative history of the National
Prohibition Act and found that Congress, via the Act, authorized
law enforcement officers to search automobiles without a warrant
if the officers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained intoxicating liquors.20 In regard to the issue of whether
this authority was consistent with the Constitution, the Court, after
considering the history of the Fourth Amendment, found that the
First, Second and Fourth Congresses, distinguished between the
necessity for a search warrant to search for goods concealed in a
dwelling house and in a movable vessel. 2 ' In addition, the Court
noted:

'"

See Carroll,267 U.S. at 134.

14Id.at

144.

11Id.at 162.
16 Id.at 134.
U

Id.

11 Id.at 140.
149.
20 Id.at 147.
21 Id.at 151.
'9 Id.at
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[T]he Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure.
. [which require a warrant] ...and a ship, motor
boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be

sought.'
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and held that
law enforcement agents were not required to obtain a warrant to
search Carroll's automobile.'
Carroll thus gave birth to the
"automobile exception," which requires three elements to be
satisfied. (1) a mobile vehicle must be involved; (2) probable
cause must exist to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a
crime; and (3) it must be impractical for the officers to secure a
warrant to search the vehicle in question.'
The dissent in Carroll' believed that the facts known to the
officers who arrested George Carroll and his associate did not give
rise to probable cause.' The dissent reasoned that the seizure
followed an unlawful arrest and thus became unreasonable.'
There was no discussion by the majority or dissent in Carroll
suggesting that the officers could have immobilized and secured
the vehicle and then made application for a search warrant' 8
22
21
24

Id at 153.
Id at 162.

Id at 159-60.

25 Id at 163-175 (McReynolds, J. dissenting joined by Justice Sutherland).
6

Id at 171.

The majority disagreed and concluded that probable cause

supported the search of the vehicle. Id at 162.

' See id at 170. The majority reasoned that the "right to search and the
validity of the seizure are not dependent upon the right to arrest but upon the
reasonable cause the seizing officer has ... that the contents of the vehicle
offend against the law." Id at 158.
' Perhaps it was not practical in Carrollfor the police to impound the vehicle,
but in some instances a vehicle may be stopped not far from the police station
and it is quite reasonable to have the car removed and secured while officers
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Therefore, a major exception to the warrant requirement was
created with all of the Justices apparently agreeing that no great
Fourth Amendment evil exists if police officers conduct a
warrantless search of a motor vehicle. In 1925, and in the
succeeding years, there was little academic commentary pertaining
to the Carrolldoctrine 9 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Carroll
on several occasions with little or no critical commentary" and
after reaffirming the automobile exception for almost fifty years,
the Supreme CQrt was again asked to review the application of
the doctrine in Chambers v. Maroney.i
III.
THE
REFINEMENT
OF
THE
ORIGINAL
JUSTIFICATION: SEIZE THE AUTO AND SEARCH
LATER
Chambers v. Maroney (1975)
In Chambers, an armed robbery took place at a service station
and shortly thereafter probable cause arose giving the police reason
to believe that the occupants of a certain vehicle were the
individuals who committed the robbery.32 Officers stopped the
vehicle. Chambers, an occupant of the vehicle, and the other
passengers were placed under arrest for armed robbery.33 The
vehicle was then brought to the police station and searched without
a warrant.34 The police conducted a thorough search of the auto
seek a warrant. In addition, many police departments today have contracts with
municipal towing companies who routinely impound cars for the police because
cars have been abandoned, involved in accidents, or the driver has been arrested
and the car must be secured. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1200
(Wilkey, J. dissenting)(arguing that tow trucks are available everywhere and
vehicles can be secured by any police department).
29

See generally, Note, 12 VA. L. REV. 236-39 (1926); Thomas E. Atkinson,

Note, 24 MICH. L. REv. 277-81 (1926).
30

See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305

U.S. 364 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 60 (1949); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
32 Id. at 46.
" Id. at 44.
34 id.
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and in a compartment under the dashboard found a loaded gun and
evidence connecting Chambers and the others to the armed
robbery.3' Chambers was convicted of the robbery and appealed
arguing that the warrantless automobile search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.36 An issue facing the Supreme Court was
whether the exigent circumstances associated with the Carroll
automobile exception still existed after the police brought the
automobile to the police station. The Court held that the search of
the car at the police station was justified under the Carrolldoctrine
because the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of a
crime was in a mobile vehicle, and even though the police had
custody of the car, the auto at the police station was still mobile.'
Justice White, writing for the majority, said that the police had two
options: they could conduct an immediate search of the car when it
was stopped, or the officers could seize and secure the vehicle
while they sought to obtain a warrant.38 Inregard to which option
constitutes a greater intrusion, the majority concluded that for
constitutional purposes there was no real difference between the
two choices because, "given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... and the
probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did
the mobility of the car."'39
How an automobile can be considered mobile when it is
immobilized at the police station in the exclusive control of the
police is a mystery. It has been suggested that this legal fiction
eliminated the exigency requirement that undergirded the Carroll
doctrine.' However, in a footnote, the Court stated that it was not
unreasonable in this case to take the car to the police station
because all of the occupants of the car were arrested in a dark
parking lot and a careful search at this time was impractical and
35 Id Officers found two guns (one loaded with dumdum bullets), a right hand
glove containing small change and a credit card bearing the name of a gas
station attendant who was robbed a week earlier.
36 Id at 46.
37 Id at 52.
38 Id
39

Id

I See, Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches And Diminished Expectations In
The WarrantClause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 564 (1982).
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perhaps not safe for the officers.4 Nevertheless, in Chambers, the
Court permitted the police to seize a car in transit and delay the
search of the vehicle until the car was safely impounded at the
police station. This position cannot square with a clear element of
the Carroll doctrine that "fuin cases .where the securing of a
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used."'4
Once a
vehicle is immobilized in police custody, it is both practicable and
reasonable for the police to secure a search warrant. Justice Harlan
in his dissent observed that the majority "concedes that the police
could prevent the removal of evidence by temporarily seizing the
car for the time necessary to obtain a warrant."43 Clearly, the
Carroll exigency requirement was subverted in Chambers and
doubt was cast upon its future viability. In subsequent cases, the
Court upheld warrantless searches of automobiles, even though the
possibility of the vehicle being removed or evidence being
destroyed was "remote or non-existent,"' and the Court has also
noted that justification to conduct a search without a warrant "does
not vanish once the car has been immobilized."45 The Fourth
Amendment automobile exception was justified in Carrollby the
mobility of the vehicle on the highway and in Chambers by the
inherent mobility of the vehicle when it was parked at the police
station. However, in later cases the Court provided another
rationale for warrantless searches of vehicles when it noted:
[O]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or a repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny.
It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its
contents are in plain view.. .This is not to say that
no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth
Amendment protection... [and] ... the desire to be
41

Chambers,399 U.S. at 52 n.10.

42

See Carroll,267 U.S. at 156.

Id. at 42 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
44 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441-442 (1973).
4 See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982).
41
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mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be
free from unreasonable intrusions.'
Approximately twelve months after Chambers, the Supreme
Court was again confronted with an automobile exception case in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.47
Coolidge v. New Hampshire(1971)
In Coolidge, a fourteen-year-old girl left her home during a
heavy snowstorm and did not return. A few days later the police
discovered her body. Shortly thereafter, the police obtained an
arrest warrant for Edward Coolidge and a search warrant for his
automobile. 4 Coolidge was arrested at his home, and his car,
which was parked in his driveway, was towed to the police station
where it was searched.49 The search of the car revealed that it was
highly probable that the deceased girl was in Coolidge's auto
before her death.' Before trial, suppression motions were denied
and Coolidge was convicted of the girl's death."1 The conviction
of Coolidge was reversed by a deeply divided Supreme Court',
which found that the warrants were not issued by a "neutral and

46 See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. See also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391
(1984).
47 403 U.S. 443 (197 1)(plurality opinion).
48 Id at 445-47.
49 Id at 447.
50 Id at 448.
11 Id Coolidge moved to suppress vacuum sweepings and particles of
gunpowder taken from his car and also evidence seized from his home.
I Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justice
Douglas, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall Id at 445. Justice Harlan, in a
concurring opinion, noted that the law of search and seizure is "due for an
overhauling" and law enforcement must find the uncertain current state of the
law to be "intolerable" Id at 490. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion Id at 492. Justice Black filed a concurring and dissenting
opinion a portion of which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
Id at 493. Justice White filed a concurring and dissenting opinion a portion of
which Chief Justice Burger joined. Id at 510.
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detached magistrate," and were therefore invalid.53 Nevertheless,
the government argued that the Carroll doctrine permitted a
warrantless seizure and search of the vehicle because there was
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was in a mobile
vehiclp,54 Justice Stewart, writing for .the Court, rejected the
government's contention and reasoned that the application of
Carrollto this case would extend it beyond its original rationale.
The Court noted that in Carroll the car was stopped on the
highway and the opportunity to search was "fleeting." 5 Since
Coolidge's car was parked in a private driveway, the opportunity
to search was "not fleeting. 56 In his dissent, Justice White argued
that this case is clearly covered by the Carroll doctrine and
"[d]istinguishing the case before us from the Carroll-Chambers
line of cases further enmeshes Fourth Amendment law in litigation
breeding refinements having little relation to reality."57 Three
years after Coolidge, another deeply divided Supreme Court58 was
once again confronted with an automobile exception case
involving a parked vehicle.
Cardwellv. Lewis (1974)
Arthur Ben Lewis was arrested for murder.59 During the
investigation the police seized his automobile without a warrant.'
His car was towed from a parking lot to a police station because
the police had probable cause to believe that Lewis' car was used
" Id. at 449. The State Attorney General who had personally taken charge of
the murder investigation and who. served as the chief prosecutor at trial issued
the warrants. Id. Under New Hampshire law the attorney general was a justice
of the peace and all justices of the peace are authorized to issue warrants. Id.
54 Id. at 458.
55

Id. at 460.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 527.

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)(plurality opinion). Justice
Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, Justice White and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell concurred in the
result. Id. at 596. Justice Stewart dissented and was joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. Id. at 596-599.
59
Id. at 585.
60 id.
58
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in the commission of a crime. 6' At the police station, the police
inspected the exterior of the auto. Paint samples and tire
impressions were taken and introduced at trial.' Following Lewis'
conviction, a habeas corpus proceeding was brought in the district
court. The court held that the seizure and examination of Lewis'
car violated the Fourth Amendment and the evidence obtained
therefrom should be suppressed.6
The Court of Appeals
6
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case and Lewis argued that his case was indistinguishable from the
warrantless search and seizure in Coolidge." The Supreme Court
reversed, and the plurality opined that the warrantless seizure and
examination of the exterior of the car was not unreasonable.6
Further, the Court said that even though the police may have
obtained a warrant to search the automobile, it "does not negate the
possibility of a current situation necessitating prompt police
action."
The dissent argued that this is simply a ease where a
warrant should have been secured to seize and search the car
because no exigent circumstances existed.'
It is difficult to reconcile Coolidge and Cardwell. In Coolidge
the Court seemed to be concerned with the fact that the search and
seizure of the automobile was not in transit, and, therefore, a
warrantless search of the automobile was unreasonable.' If there
61

Id at 587.

Id at 588.
' 354 F. Supp. 26 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
64 476 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeals held that the scraping
of paint from the exterior of Lewis' car was a search; that it was not incident to
an arrest; and the seizure of the car was not justified on the ground that the
vehicle was an instrumentality of a crime in plain view. Id at 588.
0 Id at 593.
6 Id at 592-593.
67 Id at 596.
6 Id at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting) joined by Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall.
61 Coolidge,403 U.S. at 460-465. The Court seemed concerned that the police
"knew for some time of the probable role of the car in the crime." In addition,
the Court said that the vehicle was unoccupied, parked on private property and
by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into a case
where "it is not practicable to secure a warrant" citing Carroll267 U.S. at 153.
6
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is any significant distinguishing feature between the two cases, it
appears that in Coolidge there was an extensive search of the
interior of the vehicle;7" the Coolidge vehicle was in the
defendant's driveway, and the seizure of the vehicle required an
entry upon private property when no exigent circumstances were
present.71 In Cardwell, the vehicle was parked in a public place
where access was not meaningfully restricted and police
examination was confined to the exterior of the vehicle.'
The Carroll-Chambersrule was followed in Texas v. White,73
and in Michigan v. Thomas74 where the Court again noted the
mobility of a vehicle as an important underpinning of the
automobile exception. By the mid-1970's, the Carroll doctrine
was well established and clear-cut. If law enforcement officers
had probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was in a
mobile vehicle, the officers could search the vehicle on a public
highway without a warrant,75 search the auto after transporting it to
the police station,76 seize and search vehicles parked in public
places,' and tear open upholstery. 7 Furthermore, the police could
search hidden compartments under the dashboard,79 and search
wrapped packages. 8° In addition, various Courts of Appeals
permitted the search of footlockers placed in the trunk of
automobiles,8 ' suitcases placed in a taxicab,'m and trunks loaded
70

Id. at 593 n.9.

71Id.at

593.
' Although the record reflects that the trunk of the car was also opened by the
police and they observed a tire, no evidence from any part of the interior of the

vehicle was introduced at trial. Idat 588 n.4.
7 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)(per curiam).
7 Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 59 (1982).
75 Carroll,267
76

U.S. at 286.

Chambers,399 U.S. at 42.

'n Cardwell,417 U.S. at 592-593.
78 Carroll,267 U.S. at 281.
79 Chambers,399 U.S. at 44.
' Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253 (1938).
8' United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 993-994 (9th Cir. 1973).
' United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir.1974). The Court
stated that the officer who arrested Soriano and his companions "had probable
cause to believe the trunk contained contraband, a circumstance justifying an
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into the trunk and passenger compartment of an automobile.' In
short, for more than fifty years, law enforcement officers with
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was in a mobile
vehicle could search any part of the vehicle and any container in
which it was reasonably believed the evidence was located.'
Fifty-two years after the establishment of the automobile exception
in Carroll,the United States Supreme Court began to question the
scope of the search authorized by the Carroll doctrine and in so
doing made its first major detour on the Carrollroad and slipped
into a container exception morass.
IV. THE CONTAINER EXCEPTION DETOUR
United States v. Chadwicke (1977)
In Chadwick, railroad officials in San Diego became suspicious
when they noticed that a 200-pound footlocker secured with two
padlocks was being loaded on a train for Boston and talcum
powder was leaking from the footlocker.6 The officials noted that
talcum powder is often used to mask the odor of marijuana.' Law
enforcement agents met the train in Boston where a trained police
dog sniff indicated that the footlocker contained a controlled
substance.' The agents did not seize the footlocker, but waited for
Chadwick and some of his friends to arrive and place the
footlocker in the trunk of an automobile.89 Before the automobile
engine was started, the agents moved in and arrested Chadwick
and his associates.' The agents then took the footlocker to the
Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrest, the
initial incursion into the trunk. Under established law in this circuit and
elsewhere, this justification encompassed the search of containers in the
vehicle." Id at 149.
1 United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990,993 (7th Cir.1974).
14 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,444 (198 1)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1(1977).
6 Id at 3 n. 4.
17 Id at3.
11 Id at 4.
9Di'd
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agents searched the footlocker and found a large quantity of
marijuana. 91 To the government, the legal issue seemed clear:
there was probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was in
a mobile vehicle; therefore, officers could search the vehicle and
the footlocker without a warrant pursuant to the Carrolldoctrine.
The government argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed
in the automobile, a warrantless search was permissible under the
Carroll automobile exception.'
The District Court saw the
relationship betveen the footlocker, and the automobile as "merely
coincidental," so it held that the search was not justified by the
Carroll automobile exception.93
A divided Court of Appeals
found that the government agents had probable cause to search the
footlocker and that it had been properly taken into custody.' 4
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the
seized marijuana, agreeing with the District Court that the search
of the footlocker was not justified by the automobile exception.'
However, in the Court of Appeals, the government for the first
time contended that the search of the footlocker was justified
because movable personalty lawfully seized in a public place
should be subjected to a warrantless search if there is probable
cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. 96 The Court of
Appeals rejected this contention on the ground that a search of
personalty on probable cause alone has not yet been recognized as
a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement. 7 In the
Supreme Court, the government did not contend that the search of
4-5.
2 Id. at 5. The government also attempted to justify the search of the

9' Id. at

footlocker as a search incident to an arrest.
93 393 F. Supp. 763, 771 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975). The District Court found that

the footlocker had not been transported in the automobile, it was only resting in
the trunk of the auto, the car was not running and no one was in the driver's seat.
Id. at 772. The District Court also held that there was no probable cause to
arrest Chadwick. Id. at 768.
94 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 5.

9 United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773,781 (lst Cir. 1976). The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the District Court that the search was not justified as a
search incident to an arrest.
96 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6.
97 Id. at 7.
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the footlocker was justified by the automobile exception, but
argued again that the search was justified because "movable
personalty lawfully seized in a public place should be subject to
search without a warrant... [and] ... only homes, offices, and
private communications implicate interests which lie at the core of
the Fourth Amendment. 8
The government contended that less
significant values are at stake when searching a container, and the
reasonableness of the intrusion should depend solely on whether
there is probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct is
present. In response, the Supreme Court examined the history of
the Fourth Amendment and conceded "there is little evidence that
the Framers intended the Warrant Clause to operate outside the
home ...[but also noted] . . there is little evidence at all that...
[the Framers] ... intended to exclude from the protection of the
Warrant Clause all searches occurring outside the home."
Therefore, the Court concluded that the judicial warrant has a
significant role to play in searches and seizures in that it provides
the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, a "more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law
enforcement officer."' ° In addition, the Court said important
privacy interests were at stake in this case because by "placing
personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination... [similar to one who] ... locks the
doors of his home against intruders.... The Court then noted that
it has permitted warrantless searches of automobiles partly because
of the automobile's inherent mobility,"~ which often makes
obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable and also because there is
93 Id 6-7.

9Id at 8.

"Id at 8-9, (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
'01Id at 11.
102 Id Apparently the Court believed that containers are not as mobile as cars.
However, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 n.l8 (1971)
(plurality opinion), the Court stated that a "[g]ood number of the containers that
the police might discover... and want to search are ... movable e.g., trunks,
suitcases, boxes and bags ...[and although].

. .

the automobile has wheels...

there is little difference in driving the container itself away and driving it away
in a vehicle brought to the scene for that purpose." Id
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a diminished expectation of privacy surrounding an automobile."°3
However, the Court stated that the factors that diminish privacy for
the automobile do not apply to the footlocker because the
container's contents are not open to public view, not subject to
regular -inspections .and .luggage is intended as a repository of
personal effects.) 4 In dismissing the government argument, the
Court found that the police may seize the locker upon probable
cause, but reasoned that significant privacy interests protected the
locker from being opened until a warrant is secured." 5 The dissent
vigorously disagreed with the majority," ° and noted that the search
of the footlocker could have been justified on several grounds: (1)
as a search incident to an arrest; ° (2) as an inventory search; 08
and (3) as the automobile exception provided by Carroll if the
government agents had postponed the arrest until Chadwick and
his associates started to drive away." The dissent appropriately
noted that several Courts of Appeals had previously construed the
Carrolldoctrine to include the search of briefcases, suitcases, and
footlockers in automobiles.1
Finally, the dissenting justices
observed that the law enforcement agents in Chadwick were
actually following "good police procedure" and decisions like
Chadwick "make criminal law a trap for the unwary policeman and

103Id at 13.
'41d.at 11.
105 id.

0'Id.at 17-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
07 Id.at 23. See also id. at 19, (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218

(1973), Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Edwards
415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search incident to arrest cases); Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67 (1975), Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-448 (1973), Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-52 (1970), South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364

(1976)). (Cases that involved an automobile impoundment). The dissenters
argued that a warrant is not required to seize and search movable property in

possession of a person arrested in a public place. Id.
"I5 1d citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 423 U.S. 364 (1976).
9 Id. at 22-23.
10

o Id.at 23 n.4 citing United States v. Traumunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104-1105

(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147 (5" Cir. 1974); United States v. Aviles, 535 F.
2d 658 (1976); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 993-994 (9"' Cir. 1973).
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detract from the important activities of detecting criminal activity
and protecting the public safety."'
It is possible to distinguish Chadwick from Carroll in that the
vehicle in Chadwick was actually not being operated on a public
highway, and the government did not attempt to justify the search
pursuant to the automobile exception. However, less than twenty
months later, the Court in another automobile case, Arkansas v.
Sanders,"' demonstrated that the container exception extends well
beyond the holding of Chadwick.
Arkansas v. Sanders (1979)
In Sanders, police in Arkansas had probable cause to believe that
Sanders, while exiting a local airport, was carrying a green suitcase
full of marijuana.13 Sanders placed the green suitcase in the trunk
of a taxi and drove off. Several blocks from the airport, the police
stopped the taxi, opened the trunk and found marijuana in the
suitcase." 4 The government contended that the Carroll doctrine
was applicable because there was probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime was in a mobile vehicle, and, unlike Chadwick,
the auto in Sanders was actually being operated on the public
highway."' The trial court denied Sanders motion to suppress and
he was convicted." 6 The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed,
ruling that Chadwick controlled this case and, hence, the marijuana
should be suppressed." 7 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed and stated that the automobile exception set forth in
Carroll and its progeny, will "not be extended to warrantless
searches of one's personal luggage merely because it was located

" Id at24.
112 442 U.S. 751 (1979).
"IId at 756.
4
1 1d at 755.
" 5 1d at 761.
116 1d at 756.
71d

The Arkansas Supreme Court held that there was ample probable cause
to believe that marijuana was contained in the suitcase but there was no exigent
circumstances justifying the officer's failure to secure a search warrant before
searching the luggage.
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in an automobile.""'
Following the reasoning in Chadwick, the
Court stressed the heightened expectation of privacy in luggage
and the fact that just because luggage is placed in an automobile
does not diminish the owner's expectation of privacy in such
luggage.
Chadwick and Sanders were characterized by the
majority as not extending the automobile exception to include
containers in automobiles." 9 However, in reality, these cases were
actually narrowing the scope of the search authorized by Carroll
and its progeny and creating, in effect, a container exception within
an automobile exception. In their dissent, Justice Blackmun and
Justice Rehnquist stated that Sanders actually "undermines the
automobile exception ... [and] ... creates ... difficulties for law
enforcement officers . . . prosecutors . . . [and] . . . the courts
themselves." 2
The dissent' noted that they see no reason to
impose a distinction between an automobile and luggage in an
automobile, and the "expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in a
car is probably not significantly greater than the expectation of
privacy in a locked glove compartment or tunk."'"
In a footnote in Sanders, additional confusion was created when
the Court declared "not all containers and packages found by the
police during a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment."'"
The dissent illustrated the confusion that this
worthy/unworthy container comment would create when it
suggested that "[s]till hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be
litigated, are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag,
and every other kind of container.'24 The dissent was prophetic
Id. at 763. The Court said, "some containers (for example a kit of burglar
tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support a reasonable expectation
of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.
Similarly, in some cases the contents of the package will be open to plain view..
. . There will be difficulties in determining which parcels taken from an
automobile require a warrant and which do not." Id
"9 Id. at 765.
120 Id at 768.
118

121

Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting joined by Justice Rehnquist).

Id. at 769. In three years the position of the dissent would become the
majority in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
'2 Id. at 764 n.13.
24
'
Id. at 768.
1
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and numerous cases were litigated regarding the worthy/unworthy
container comment involving an extraordinary variety of
containers."2 The dissent argued that it would be better to adopt a
clear-cut rule that a warrant should not be required to seize and
search any personal property found in an automobile because such
a policy would simplify criminal procedure without derogating
Fourth Amendment values.'26 Less than two years after Sanders,
another automobile exception case, Robbins v. California,' 7 found
its way onto the docket of the United States Supreme Court.
Robbins v. California(1981)
In Robbins, police officers stopped a station wagon that was
being driven erratically on a public highway.'8 When Robbins
opened the car door, the officers smelled marijuana emanating
from the vehicle."2 In a subsequent search of the interior of the
car, officers found marijuana."z' In the tailgate section of the
station wagon, the police found two packages wrapped in green
opaque plastic.' The police opened the packages and discovered
fifteen pounds of marijuana in each.' The lower court upheld the
search, reasoning that the contents of the packages could have been
inferred from their outward appearance, and there was no
33
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, and in a plurality
decision opined that the automobile exception did not authorize the
opening of the packages without a warrant."3 The plurality
"2 In United States v. Ross, 665 F. 2d 1159, 1174-1175 nn.3&4 (D.C. Cir.

1981) (en banc) (Tamm, J. dissenting) noted numerous cases that were litigated
re the worthy container issue.
'26 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 772.
127 453

U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).

128 Id at 422.
29

1 Id
131 id

132 1d
133 Id
'3'

at 428.
Id at 421. Justice Stewart authored the opinion and was joined by Justice

Brennan, Justice White and Justice Marshall. Chief Justice Burger concurred in
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believed that the search was invalid because Chadwick and
Sanders established that a closed piece of luggage found in a car is
protected to the same extent as closed pieces of luggage found
anywhere else. The Court said that a "diary and a dish pan are
equally protected by the Fourth Amendment., 35 The Court
rejected the "worthy container" concept and held that all containers
except those whose contents are in plain view are equally protected
by the Fourth Amendment.' 6
Chadwick, Sand rs and Robbins created a great deal of confusion
and raised serious questions about the scope of a search pursuant to
the Carroll doctrine. In Carroll, the police tore open the
upholstery,1 37 and in Chambers, the police took apart a
compartment under the dashboard 38 to find evidence of a crime,
and both of these searches were held to be reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The question that arose was
whether there exists a greater expectation of privacy in closed
containers than in parts of a vehicle that are clearly hidden from
public view. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, alluded to
this issue when he said that the "[p] lurality's approach strains the
rationales of our prior cases and imposes substantial burdens upon
law enforcement without vindicating any significant values of
privacy.', 139 Chadwick; Sanders and Robbins seemed to suggest
the following constitutional rules regarding the searches of
vehicles. If the police have probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime is in a mobile vehicle, the police are authorized to
search every inch of such vehicle without a warrant, which would
include tearing apart upholstery and other parts of the auto.
However, if the police come upon a closed container (luggage,
footlocker, paper bag) in a vehicle in which they have probable
cause to believe evidence of a crime is located, the officers must
the judgment Id. at 429.

Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the

judgment proclaiming that the law of search and seizure is "intolerably
confusing" Id at 430. Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist
filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 436-453.
Id.at 425.
136 Id.at 427.
137
Carroll,267 U.S. at 281.
138 Chambers,399 U.S. at 44.
139 Robbins, 453 U.S. at 429.
'35
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cease searching and secure a warrant to authorize the opening of
the container.
Further adding to the legal confusion pertaining to vehicle
searches was New York v. Belton"4° which was decided by the
Supreme Court on the same day as Robbins. In Belton, a police
officer in New York stopped a vehicle for speeding. While talking
to the driver and passengers, the officer smelled the odor of
marijuana emanating from the car and observed an envelope on the
floor of the car marked "Supergold," which the officer recognized
as a package commonly used to carry marijuana. 4 ' The officer
ordered the driver and the passengers out of the car and retrieved
the package from the car, opened it, and concluded that it was
marijuana. 42 The officer returned to the automobile and conducted
a search of a jacket found on the rear seat and discovered cocaine
and identification linking the jacket to one of the passengers named
Belton. 43 The occupants of the vehicle were arrested and
subsequently challenged the seizure of the evidence.' The trial
court denied Belton's motion to suppress and the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the search based upon the view that a lawful
arrest justified the search of the immediate area including the
interior of the automobile.' 4 The New York State Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the search of the closed pockets in
the jacket could not be justified as a search incident to an arrest.46
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
reversed, and held that the search incident to arrest rule of Chimel
v. California,47 permits a search of the passenger compartment of

11o
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
141 1d at 455-456.
142
143

Id at 456.
Id

144Id

Dep't
145 People v. Belton, 68 A.D. 2d 198, 201, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (4
1979).
1 People v. Belton, 50 N.Y 2d 447, 449 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d
574,575 (1980).
147 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the vehicle and all containers found within the passenger
48
compartment. 1
Belton thus created a "bright-line" search incident to arrest rule
with respect to automobiles. Nevertheless, Belton created another
anomaly with respect to the search of containers in automobiles. If
the police lawfully arrest a motorist pursuant to Belton, and the
police have no suspicion whatsoever that the motorist has
contraband in the passenger compartment, Belton authorizes the
police to make a warrantless search of the passenger compartment
and any containers found therein. However, under Robbins, even
if the police have "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 149 that there is
evidence of a crime in a container which is located in the trunk of a
vehicle, the officers may not search the container without a
warrant. A prominent New York State Justice once referred to the
general confusion surrounding automobile searches as compelling
Courts to "wander endlessly through this labyrinth of judicial
uncertainty."' 50 In the following colloquy a criminal justice
professional described the problems associated with police
academy training of recruits with respect to the rationale and the
5
differences between Belton and Robbins.1
Recruit No. 1: Sarge, I'm not clear on this at all.
Who sets reasonable expectations of privacy?
Sarge: Well, the Supreme Court says they're set by
general social norms.

148 Id. at

462-463.

149 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 597 (1991)
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting) Stevens argued that proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not justify
the search of a container in a mobile vehicle and the extent to which the police
are certain of the contents of a container has no bearing on the authority to

search. Id.
150 People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 263, 298 N.E.2d 78, 83, 344 N.Y.S.2d
900, 907 (1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
151 James J. Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: Robbins, Belton and Ross -The
Policeman's Lot Becomes A Happier One, 18 CRiM. L. BULL. 461, 464-465
(1982).
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Recruit No. 2: But then didn't Belton have a
reasonable expectation that his zippered jacket
pockets are private?
Sarge: Well, that's different. That was a search
pursuant to an arrest.
Recruit No. 3: But aren't searches pursuant to an
arrest limited to the area within the immediate
control of the suspect? Belton was nowhere near
his jacket when it was searched.
Sarge: No, autos are an exception. When you
arrest someone in a car you can search everything
found in the car.
Recruit No. 4: But you can't go into a concealed
luggage compartment, right?
Sarge: No, no. The search of Robbins' luggage
compartment was fine. But once they got there,
they violated Robbins' reasonable expectation of
privacy in the plastic bricks.
Recruit No. 5: You mean that Robbins had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a concealed
luggage compartment; but he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the plastic bricks?
Sarge: Now you've got it. Read Robbins again. It
says people can't expect much privacy in a car
because it's not used as a residence or a place to
store personal effects, and because people and
things in cars travel in plain view.
Recruit No. 6: But the two bricks were not in plain
view.
They were in a concealed luggage
compartment.
The car companies put those
compartments in station wagons specifically so that
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people can store things out of sight. In my
neighborhood, if you left two plastic bricks or
anything else where people could see it in parked
cars, the junkies would steal it in a minute. Didn't
you tell us in crime prevention class to always
advise citizens to put things in the trunks of their
cars where they'd be out of sight?
Reduit No. 7: Sarge, how can they possibly say a
car's luggage compartment is not a repository for
personal effects? I keep a thousand dollar set of
golf clubs in my trunk.
What if I was arrested in my car? The cops
could search the car, but when they came to the
zipper compartment on the side of my golf bag they
couldn't open it, is that right?
Recruit No. 8: Yeah, Sarge, what if you arrest a guy
in a motor home out on the road? Can you go
through all the drawers and kitchen cabinets, but not
any plastic bag? What if he's got a coat hanging in
the closet? Can you search that? Can you search a
medicine cabinet in a motor home?
Sarge: Well, now that we've got that all squared
away, let's go on to talk about automobile
accidents. 52
'
Echoing similar sentiments regarding complex search and
seizure rules and the ability of police officers to apply these rules,
a commentator opined:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the
drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions,
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which facile
minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they
152 Id
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may be literally impossible of application by the
officer in the field."
One may argue that the difference between the result in Belton
and Robbins was justified because Belton involved a search
incident to an arrest and Robbins involved a search pursuant to the
automobile exception;" nevertheless, the rationale for the
distinction between these two cases decided on the same day is, at
best, puzzling. The philosophical underpinnings of Belton and
Robbins are clearly incompatible. The privacy interest in closed
containers that was so important in Chadivick, Sanders and
Robbins was jettisoned in Belton in an effort to create a bright-line
search incident to arrest rule with respect to automobiles. In
Robbins, Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, suggested that a
future case might afford the Court an opportunity to address "the
confusion that infects this benighted area of the law."'" Hence, it
is no wonder that only nine months after deciding Robbins, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear another automobile exception case.
V. ENDING THE CHADWICK/SANDERS DETOUR
UnitedStates v. Rosst m (1982)
A reliable informant told a Washington, D.C. detective that an
individual known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics that were kept
'5 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 quoting Lafave, Case-by-Case Adjudication versus
Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127,
141.
"sKatz, supra note 40 at 596-597 (arguing that Belton and Robbins may be

reconciled to some extent because they involve different exceptions to the
warrant clause and neither Robbins nor Belton breaks new ground and stare
decisis arguably supports both). See also Catherine A. Sheppard, Search and
SeLz-ure: From Carrollto Ross, The Odssey of the Automobile Exception, 32
CATH U. L. REv. 221, 243 (1982) arguing that Belton and Robbins articulate
clear and easily applicable rules. But cf Barry Latzer, Searching Cars And

Their contents: United States v.Ross 18 CaiM. L. BULL. 399 (1982) arguing that
Belton is only superficially consistent with Chimel and Robbins conflicts with
Carroll.
5

ld; See also Robbins 453 U.S. at 437.

156 456

U.S. 798 (1982).
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in the trunk of a particular car, and that "Bandit" told the informant
that additional narcotics were also in the trunk of the car. 5 7 The
informant described the vehicle and the suspect named "Bandit."
The police subsequently saw the suspected vehicle and a license
plVe check revealed that the car was registered to Albert Ross.1 58
The police stopped the car and asked Mr. Ross to get out of the
vehicle. 9 The police then searched Ross, observed a bullet on the
front seat of the car and found a gun in the glove compartment."G
A warrantless search of the trunk revealed a brown paper bag that
contained heroin and another bag containing $3,200 in cash. 6'
The heroin and money were introduced at trial and Ross was
convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 62 The
Court of Appeals reversed and held that pursuant to Sanders, the
police should not have opened either container without first
obtaining a warrant.' 63
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
case and began its opinion by noting that there is, with respect to
vehicle searches, "no dispute among judges about the importance
of striving for clarification in this area of law. '' 6' The Court
reviewed its previous cases, the extensive history of the automobile
exception, and considered the privacy interests protected by
Carroll and the enormous confusion that the Chadwick-Sanders
line of cases created. 65 The Supreme Court then reversed the
Court of Appeals and stated, "privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container ... [and] ... if probable cause justifies the search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of that
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the

157

Id. at 800.

158 .id.
59

1 Id at 801.
160 id.
161

Id.

Id
'63 Id. at 801.
'6 Id. at 803.
162

161 Id. 805-808.
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Although the Court did not specifically overrule
search."'"
Chadwick and Sanders, it rejected the reasoning in Sanders and it
specifically rejected the precise holding in Robbins.'6
Nevertheless, the doctrinal underpinnings of Chadwick and
Sanders were seriously questioned when the Court observed:
During virtually the entire history of our countrywhether contraband was transported in a horse
drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modem
automobile, it has been assumed that a lawful
search of a vehicle would include a search of any
container that might conceal the object of the
search.'6'
The Ross Court was clearly attempting to emerge from the
container exception morass and return to the principles set forth in
Carroll and Chambers. The exigency issue, which at least one
commentator believed was eliminated in Chambers,69 was noted
by Justice Marshall in his dissent. Justice Marshall said that Ross
was a "step toward an unprecedented probable cause exception to
the warrant requirement 7 ' because the majority stated that the
scope of an automobile exception search is as broad as a magistrate
Justice
could authorize in a warrant to search the automobile.'
Marshall saw this seemingly benign statement as a "sleight of
'
hand,"
because a magistrate can order a search on probable
cause alone with no exigency regarding the mobility of the vehicle.
If an officer has the same authority as a magistrate, then the officer
has no exigency restriction when he or she makes a warrantless
search pursuant to the Carrolldoctrine. Subsequent cases would
reveal that Justice Marshall was quite prophetic in this

166id
167Id

at 824.

1s Id at 820 n.26.
169 Grano,supranote

10.
Ross 456 U.S. at 828.
171Id at 825.
172
Id at 833.
170
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observation.173 In Ross the majority further stated that if it was
reasonable for government agents to:
[r]ip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly
would be reasonable for them to look into a burlap
sack stashed inside; if it was reasonable to open a
concealed compartment in Chambers,it would have
been equally reasonable to open a paper bag
crumpled-within it. A contrary rule could produce
absurd results inconsistent with the decision in
Carrollitself.174
The majority in Ross purported to distinguish Chadwick and
Sanders by observing that in neither of these cases did the police
have probable cause to search the cars in question but only the
containers therein.175 Nevertheless, in effect, the Court was saying
that the Chadwick-Sanders container exception was a big mistake
that has produced absurd results and is inconsistent with the
automobile exception. In spite of the Court's rejection of Robbins
and its substantial return to the Carrolldoctrine in Ross, the scope
of the automobile exception continued to be somewhat muddied.
In Oklahoma v. Castleberry,76
' the Oklahoma courts found that
although the police had probable cause to believe that individuals
were carrying drugs in a suitcase in the trunk of their car, a warrant
was required. 77 The Supreme Court's 4-4 decision resulted in
"7See Pennsylvania v. Labron 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (per curiam) in

which the Supreme Court held that if a car is readily movable and probable
cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus
permits the police to search the vehicle without more. The Court reversed the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which held that an exigency requirement was
necessary. See also, Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999), in which the
Court upheld the warrantless seizure of an automobile even though the police
had several months to secure a warrant. In Maryland v. Dyson, 119 S.Ct. 2013,
2014 (1999) (per curiam) Justice Thomas cited Ross as the case that eliminated
the Carrollexigency requirement.
174

Id at 818.
171 Id
at 814.
176471 U.S. 146 (1985).
'" Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720 (Okl. Cr.1984).

Police officers had

probable cause to believe drugs were in a suitcase and a band aid box in the
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affirming the Oklahoma courts. After Ross and Castleberrty it
appeared that automobile search rules were as follows: if the police
had probable cause to search a vehicle, then the entire vehicle,
including closed containers, could be searched without a warrant.7
However, if the police had probable cause to search only a
container within the vehicle, the police could not search the
container without a warrant because the Chadwick-Sanders rule
would apply.' To address this anomaly, the Court agreed to hear
another automobile exception case.
VI. The Demise of the Container Exception - A Return to the
Carroll and Chambers - One Rule to Govern Automobile
Searches
Californiav. Acevedo' (1991)
Police in California had probable cause to believe that Charles
Acevedo had placed a bag containing marijuana in the trunk of an
automobile.'
Acevedo then started to drive away. Fearing the
loss of evidence, officers stopped the car, searched the bag and
found marijuana.'8' Acevedo pleaded guilty upon the District
The Court of
Court denying Acevedo's motion to suppress."
Appeals reversed concluding that although the police had probable
cause to believe that the bag contained drugs, the case was
controlled by Chadwick and the police could seize the package, but
could not open it without a warrant." The United States Supreme
Court agreed to review the case to specifically reexamine the law
applicable to a closed container in an automobile, a subject that the
Court noted has "troubled the courts and law enforcement officers
trunk of a vehicle and they made a warrantless search. The Court reasoned that
Chadwick-Sanderswas controlling and suppressed the evidence.
178 See United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394 (9th 1986)(citing Ross and
Castleberryas controlling authority.).
179 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
1& Id

'11.d at 568.
11 Id at 567.
'13 Id at 568.
184 Id
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ever since it was first considered in Chadwick 85 After examining
the facts in Acevedo and the previous automobile exception cases,
the Court concluded that Ross had undermined Sanders and
requiring a warrant to search the car in Sanders was a mistake.'86
"[The rule not only has] failed to protect privacy, but it has also
confused the courts and police officers and impeded effective law
enforcement."'" The Court then cited examples of how the
discrepancy between Carroll and the Chadwick-Sanders rules had
led to confusion. 8 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and concluded that Carrollprovides one rule to govern all
automobile searches. The Court held that "[t]he police may search
an automobile and the containers within it where they have
probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained."'8 9
Hence, in Acevedo the Court returned to its previous view of
Carroll-Chambersand retreated from its forays into the container
exception cases of Chadwick-Sanders. The Court suggested that
its decision in Acevedo will not have a great impact upon
automobile searches because the police will often be able to search
automobiles and containers as an incident to an arrest pursuant to
Belton,' 90 and, since the police have probable cause to seize
property under Chadwick, a "[w]arrant will be routinely
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases."' 9 ' The Court
was critical of the Chadwick-Sanders rule because it permitted
fortuitous circumstances to determine the outcome of the search of
containers found in an automobile." 9 Acevedo rejected the
Chadwick-Sanders distinction between automobiles and personal
property that may be placed in an automobile and in effect held
185
Id. at 568-69.
186

Id. at 576-77.

187id.

"88 Id. at 577-78.
189 Id.at 580-81.
190Id
'9'

Id. at 575.

Id. "Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of
an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a
container that coincidentally turns up an automobile. The protections of the
Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences." Id.
192
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that the reduced expectation of privacy
in an automobile now
93
applies to containers placed in vehicles.1
Justice Stevens, vigorously dissenting,' 94 argued that no exigency
was shown to support the warrantless search,"9 and the majority
decision actually "enlarges the scope of the automobile
exception."'" He also noted that it is anomalous to "prohibit the
search of a briefcase while the owner is carrying it exposed on a
public street [and] yet permit the search once the owner has placed
the briefcase in the locked trunk of a car."'" Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion responded by suggesting if a "known drug
dealer is carrying a briefcase believed to contain marijuana... the
police may arrest him and search on the basis of probable cause
alone."' " Finally, the majority noted the virtue of providing clear
and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession and
concluded that it is better to adopt a clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for
closed containers set forth in Sanders.!"°
VIL Other Cases Adhering to the Carroll Doctrine - The
Hybrid Vehicle - A Mobile Home
Calfornia v. Carnej

(1985)

Carney involved a case in which federal agents were watching a
fully mobile motor home because they suspected that Charles
Carney, the occupant of the mobile home, was using it to sell drugs

193 Id at 580.

194
Id at 585. Justice Stevens dissented and was joined by Justice Marshall.

Justice Stevens referred to the majority decision as lending support for the
proposition that the "Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's
fight against crime." Id at 601.
,9 Id at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'96 Id at 598.
197"Id

'9' Id at 584-85. Justice Scalia's position is that the search of containers
outside a building based upon probable cause does not require a warrant.
199 Id at 579.
2w°471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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in return for sex."0 Their suspicions were confirmed when a
youngster exited the mobile home and reported that he had
received drugs in exchange for sexual favors. =° Without a warrant
or consent, one of the federal agents entered the mobile home and
observed marijuana- and drug paraphernalia. 23 A subsequent
warrantless search of the mobile home at the police station
revealed more marijuana in the cupboards and refrigerator. 4
Carney argued that since the vehicle was his home, it should be
given Fourth Amendment protection as if it were immobile
pursuant to Payton v. New York, 25 and that law enforcement
personnel should not be able to search this vehicle without a
warrant. 24 The Supreme Court recognized that Carney's vehicle
possessed some attributes of a home, but found that the vehicle
was mobile by the turn of an ignition key and was subject to the
20 7
same licensing and regulation requirements as automobiles.
Therefore it is governed by the Carroll automobile exception.2 8
Three dissenting justices argued that the Carroll doctrine should
not apply to a vehicle parked in a parking lot a few blocks from a
courthouse when there was clearly time to obtain a warrant.2" The
majority refused to accept the exigency restriction and held that the
201 Id. at
202

387-388.
1d at 388.
203 Id.
204 Id.
201 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) where the Court held that the
police may not enter a home without a warrant to arrest a person accused of
murder unless the police have a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances exist.
206 Carney,471 U.S. at 393.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 392-93.
209 Id. at 395. Justice Stevens with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
joined dissenting stated that warrantless searches of mobile homes are only
reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways
or when exigent circumstances require an immediate search. Id. at 402. The
dissenters noted that in this case Carney's home was parked in an off-the-street
lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens
of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application. Id. 404. In
addition, in a footnote, the dissenters quoted from the transcript of the
suppression hearing where it was noted that a telephonic search warrant could be
obtained for "20 cents and the nearest phone booth." Id. at 404 n. 16.
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search was justified within the scope of the Carroll automobile
exception.210 When there is time to get a warrant, the courthouse is
nearby, and the parked vehicle has some of the attributes of a
home, it would seem that a warrant requirement should not be so
easily dispensed with. However, the majority in Carney were
unwilling to follow this basic requirement of the original Carroll
doctrine.
VMI. The Demise of the CarrollExigency Requirement
Pennsylvania v. Labron2 (1997)
Labron involved two consolidated cases in which police officers
in Pennsylvania conducted warrantless searches of automobiles."'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
requires that the police obtain a warrant before searching an
automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.2 3 In Labron,
the police observed Labron and his associates involved in street
drug transactions and the police saw Labron put drugs in the trunk
of a car.21 ' The police arrested Labron and his accomplices, and
based upon probable cause, searched the trunk of the car and found
a bag of cocaine.2 5
In the second case, Kilgore, the police with probable cause to
believe that drugs were in Randy Kilgore's pick-up truck, searched
the truck while it was parked in the driveway of a farmhouse and
found cocaine on the floor of the truck.21 6 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the convictions of Labron and Kilgore,
210 Id at 394-395. The majority was persuaded by the fact that, "It]he DEA
agents had fresh, direct, un-contradicted evidence that the respondent was
distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, apart from the evidence of
other possible offenses. The agents thus had probable cause to enter and search
the vehicle for evidence of a crime notwithstanding its possible use as a
dwelling place." Id
21 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam).

212
2 13

Id
Id at 939.

21

4 id

215 Id
216 Id
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holding that the police cannot simply search a vehicle upon
probable cause and should "obtain a warrant before searching an
automobile unless exigent circumstances are present. '217 The
United States Supreme Court in a per curiam decision reversed and
held "[I]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits
police to search the vehicle without more., 218 Hence, the Court
clearly rejected the exigency element of the Carroll doctrine and
the doctrine has thus become a one-element rule. If the police
have (1) probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is in a
vehicle,219 the police may search the vehicle even if it would be
reasonable and practical to secure a search warrant.
IX. Several Month Delay Before Seizing An Auto - No
WarrantRequired
Floridav. White' ° (1999)
On numerous occasions police officers observed White using his
automobile to deliver cocaine." Several months later, believing
that White's car was subject to forfeiture under Florida law, the
police seized the car without a warrant.222 During an inventory
search of the vehicle, officers discovered cocaine in the ashtray. 3
White was arrested and before trial moved to suppress the cocaine
as the fruit of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion
and White was convicted. 224 A divided Florida Supreme Court
held that just because the police develop probable cause to believe
217 Id.
218

219

Id.
Id. The vehicle no longer has to be mobile. It may be secured at the police

station. See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (holding vehicle
may be parked in a public place); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)

(holding it may be parked in a private driveway.); Pennsylvania v. Labron 116
S. Ct. 2485 (1997) (per curiam).
220
119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999).
22'Id. at 1557.
222

Id.

2'Id.at 1558.
224

Id.
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that a violation of the Forfeiture Act exists, this does not "standing
alone... justify a warrantless seizure."'2 In essence, the Florida
Court held that absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to seizing
a vehicle.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, reversed holding that the police do not
have to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a
public place when the police believe that the vehicle is forfeitable
contraband.' The several month delay in seizing the auto did not
suggest to the majority that the police could easily secure a search
warrant to seize the car. Instead, Justice Thomas noted, "our
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence has consistently accorded law
enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising their duties in
public places."''
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer concurred in
the decision, subject to the qualification that the holding not be
read as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of anything a
State chooses to call contraband2m The dissent229 argued that a
warrant should have been obtained not because the "[s]tate offers a
weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant... but that it offers no
reason at all." Finally, the dissent noted that the Court professes
fidelity to the usual rule that searches without warrants are per se
unreasonable, but its decision suggests "that the exceptions have
all but swallowed the rule."' 1
X. Mobile Vehicle Plus Probable Cause - No Exigency
Requirement
Marylandv. Dyson21 (1999)
Id
226Id at 1560.
227M
22 8 d

at 1559.

at 1560.

"2Id (Stevens,

J., dissenting with whom Justice Ginsburg joined).
Id at 1563. The dissent argued "on this record, one must assume that the
officers who seized White's car simply preferred to avoid the hassle of seeking
approval from ajudicial officer."
23 Id at 1561.
232 119 S. Ct. 2013 (1999) (per curiam).
230
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A Maryland police officer received a tip from a reliable
informant that Dyson, a known drug dealer, was in New York
purchasing cocaine and would return to Maryland in a rented red
Toyota automobile with license number DDY-787. 33 The officer
confirmed that the license number given to him belonged to the
Toyota rented by Dyson.234 Upon Dyson's return to Maryland,
officers conducted a warrantless search of the car and found 23
grams of cocaine base in the trunk. 5 Dyson was convicted and
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed, finding that
the Fourth Amendment required not only probable cause to search
a mobile vehicle, but also a separate finding of exigency
precluding the police from obtaining a warrant. 6
In a per curiam decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "under our established precedent, the
automobile exception has no separate exigency ... [and] . . .if a
car is readily mobile, and if probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment.. . permits police to
search the vehicle without more. 237
XII. Rejection of a Passenger Property Rule Exception to the
Carroll Doctrine
Wyoming v. Houghton23s (1999)
In Houghton, police officers stopped an automobile for
speeding. 3 9 During this routine traffic stop, an officer noticed a
233 Id.
at 2013.

24Id.
235

Id.

236

Id. Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded

that "although there was abundant probable cause, the search violated the Fourth
Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it

significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant." Id.
23' Id. at 2014. The precedent referred to by the Court was United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 and Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per
curiam). In Labron, the Court held that the "automobile exception does not
have a separate exigency requirement." Id. at 940.
238

119 S.Ct.1297 (1999).
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hypodermic syringe in the driver's pocket and the officer
instructed the driver to get out of the car and place the syringe on
the hood of the car.2' The driver complied and when asked why
he had the syringe, he said, "he used it to take drugs."' 4 ' At this
point, additional police officers arrived and ordered two female
passengers out of the car.242 An officer searched the passenger
compartment of the car for contraband and found a purse that
passenger Sandra Houghton claimed was hers. 243
The officer found drug paraphernalia in the purse and arrested
Houghton.2 '
The trial court denied Houghton's motion to
suppress and held that the officer had probable cause to search the
car for contraband and by extension any containers therein that
could hold such contraband.245 Houghton was convicted and a
divided Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the search of the purse
violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer "knew or
should have known that the purse did not belong to the
driver... [and] ... because there was no probable cause to search the
passenger's personal effects.2 The Wyoming Supreme Court thus
created a passenger property rule exception to Carroll. Upon
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court framed the
issue as whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment
when they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an
automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains
contraband.247
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reviewed the history of
the automobile exception, quoted extensively from Ross, and noted
that "it is uncontested that the police had probable cause to believe
that there were illegal drugs in the car... [and] ...neither Ross
itself, nor the historical evidence . . . admits of a distinction
23 9

1d. at 1299.

24 0 Id

at 1298.
241
Id at 1299.
242 Id.
)

243 Md

at 1299.

24

5 Id at 1300.
246 Id
247

d at 1299.
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between packages or containers based upon ownership.""24 Justice
Scalia was critical of the Wyoming Supreme Court's passenger
property rule exception to Carroll, and said that if it became
widely known, one would expect that passengers would claim
various property as their own and thus the passenger property
exception would result in a "bog of litigation ... civil suits and
motions to suppress ... [regarding]... whether the officer should
have believed the passenger's claim of ownership." 49 Justice
Breyer in a concurring opinion noted that if the police were
required to establish ownership of a container prior to a search of
the container the resulting uncertainty would destroy the
workability of the bright-line rule set forth in Ross.2'0 Thus the
Court concluded that the "sensible rule" which is supported by
"history and case law" is that an automobile passenger's property
may be searched whether or not the passenger is present if the
police have probable cause to search the car."
The dissent" 2 argued that the police should have a warrant and
individualized probable cause before searching belongings in the
custody of a passenger of an automobile. 3 Further, the dissent
argued that the Court has always made a distinction between the
search of drivers of motor vehicles and the search of passengers of
motor vehicles. 4 The dissenters were not "persuaded that the
mere spatial association between a passenger and a driver provides
Id. at 1300-0 1. Justice Scalia noted that even if the historical evidence were
equivocal, the Court would find that balancing the relative interests weighs in
favor of allowing a search of a passenger's property because "passengers like
drivers possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to property they
transport
in cars." Id. at 1302.
249
Id. at 1302.
250 Id. at 1304.
248

25 Id. at 1303-04.

Id. at 1304 (Stevens, J., dissenting was joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Ginsburg).
13 Id. at 1306. Justice Stevens argues that a rule requiring a warrant and
252

individualized probable cause is every bit as simple as the Court's rule and it

protects privacy. Further, he views the majority decision as extending the
automobile exception to allow searches of passenger's belongings based upon a
driver's misconduct.
" Id. at 1305. The dissent relies upon United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) for this proposition.
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an acceptable basis for presuming that they are partners in crime or
for ignoring privacy interests in a purse." ' One can speculate that
the majority in Houghton, having recently abandoned the container
exception rule of Chadwick-Sanders, was quite reluctant to be
drawn into a new personal property exception to the automobile
exception.
XI. Conclusion
When the Carroll doctrine was created in 1925, it was a three
element rule requiring, (1) probable cause, (2) a mobile vehicle,
and (3) a requirement that in cases where securing a warrant is
practicable the police should not engage in a warrantless search.'
The first fifty years of the Carrolljourney were relatively straight
and stable. However, in Chambers when the Supreme Court
permitted the warrantless search of a vehicle safely secured at a
police station, it seriously undermined the Carroll exigency
requirement. Subsequently the Court specifically abolished the
exigency requirement in Labron and this is the most troubling
aspect of the Carroll journey. If the Court in Chambers had
decided that officers were not authorized to conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle that was safely secured at a police station, the
Carroll doctrine may have survived its seventy-five year journey
intact. Because the exigency element of the Carrolldoctrine is so
essential to protect privacy interests in vehicles, one would hope
that the Supreme Court would reconsider its decision in Chambers.
However, in light of Labron, Dyson and White, this seems to be
wishful thinking. Therefore, each state should, under its state
constitution, consider providing greater privacy with respect to
automobiles than the protection provided by the Supreme Court.'
25. Id

See supranotes 23-24 and accompanying text.
' See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protections ofIndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). See, eg., State
v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363 (Con 1993). This case held that a warrantless
automobile search supported by probable cause, but conducted after the
automobile has been impounded at the police station violates Article first,
section seven of the Connecticut constitution. Miller rejects the Supreme Court
decision in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
256
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The container exception detour created by Chadwick, Sanders
and Robbins appeared to represent an attempt by the Court to rein
in the "warrantless cat" that was let out of the bag in Carroll and
Chambers. The concept used by the Court to attempt to curb the
broad police power authorized by Carroll-Chamberswas to find
greater Fourth Amendment protection for containers in vehicles 8
than for the integral parts of a vehicle that may conceal evidence of
a crime."
Certainly, the confusion and anomalous doctrine
created by Chadwick-Sanders was a motivating factor for the
Court in abandoning its container exception approach. However,
another important factor was that the automobile exception is well
grounded in the history of the Fourth Amendment2" and the
container cases of Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins were clearly
incompatible with this doctrine. 6 '
It is regrettable that the Court jettisoned the exigency
requirement and reduced the Carroll doctrine to a one-element
probable cause rule. Nevertheless, more important than the
decisions in Carroll and its progeny are the far-reaching
implications of the Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The automobile exception cases suggest that the
Court may have turned against the warrant requirement in many
areas outside of a home. In Chadwick the government argued that
no warrant was necessary to search movable personalty outside the
home if the police have probable cause.26 The majority of the
Supreme Court quickly rejected this argument stating that warrants
provide significant protection from unreasonable government

258See

Sanders,442 U.S. at 751; Robbins, 453 U.S. at 420 (1981).

2'9 See Carroll,267 U.S. at 132 (1925) (finding that it is not unreasonable to
search the upholstery of an auto.); See also Chambers, 399 U.S. at 42 (1970)
(finding that it is not unreasonable to search a compartment under the dashboard
of an auto).
210 See id. at 147-156. Chief Justice Taft's analysis of the constitutional basis
for the Carroll doctrine.
261 See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 818 "[1]f it was reasonable to open a concealed
compartment in Chambers, it would have been equally reasonable to open a
paper bag crumpled within it... [and] ... [a] ... contrary rule could produce
absurd results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself." Id.
262 UnitedStates v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 6 (1977).
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intrusions.Y Justice Brennan called the government argument an
"extreme view of the Fourth Amendment26
Even Justice
Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist in their dissent "found it
unfortunate that the Government sought reversal in this case
primarily to vindicate "an extreme view of the Fourth
Amendment" that would restrict the protection of the Warrant
Clause to private dwellings and a few other "high privacy areas."s
However, after the elimination of the Carroll exigency
requirement and the broad language of the Court in White
regarding providing greater Fourth Amendment latitude for the
police in public places, this so-called "extreme view of the Fourth
Amendment" may find its way back on the docket of the Supreme
Court. Several questions that arise as a result of the recent
automobile cases are: (1) Does the warrant clause only protect
privacy in homes? (2) Does the warrant clause apply to containers
outside of vehicles and outside of homes? (3) Does the warrant
clause apply at all outside of a home?
The Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, professed
fidelity to the so-called cardinal principle that "searches without
warrants are per se unreasonable -subject to a few well delineated
exceptions '"
The Court has said that these exceptions are
jealously guarded and carefully drawn,26 and the Court has
repeated its endorsement of this principle in recent cases.'
Unfortunately, this rule, however noble and well intended, does not
reflect reality. "Despite the recognized intrinsic value of the
warrant process, the vast majority of governmental intrusions are

SId
Id at 16 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting joined by Justice Rehnquist).
26 6Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1964).
2 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) citing Jones v. United States, 357
U.S.
493,499 (1958).
2 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct.
1555, 1559 (1999). Supposedly these few warrant exceptions are provided
where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law
enforcement officers or the risk of loss of destruction of evidence outweighs the
reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 751, 759 (1979).
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made without warrants."269 The average police officer in America
may never conduct a search without a warrant. Police searches by
warrant are the rare exception and not the norm. The so-called
"cardinal principle" pertaining to the warrant requirement has been
"so riddled with exceptions" ' that the exceptions created by
United State Supreme Court decisions "have all but swallowed the
rule." ' 1 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court in the
future will actually acknowledge that its jurisprudence with respect
to the Carrolld&ctrine is inconsistent with the '!cardinal principle"
and is more reflective of a position that the Fourth Amendment
"requires reasonableness, not warrants.272

269

Katz, supra note 40.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct 1555, 1561 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 65-66 (1950). "A rule of thumb
requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be
appealing ... [b]ut we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized
into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search .... It is appropriate to
note that the Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be secure in
their persons should not be violated without a search warrant .... [S]earches
turn upon the reasonableness under the circumstances and not upon the
practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not required." Id.
270

27'
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